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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
EVIDENTIARY IMMUNITY OF CAB ACCIDENT
RECORDS AND REPORTS
B ECAUSE of the vital status which aviation occupies in today's society,
an ever-present necessity exists to promote maximum safety standards
for air travel. To a great extent, these standards are formulated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board,' which determines accident causes and promulgates rules
designed to prevent similar occurrences in the future.2 To determine the
cause of an accident, the Board must carry on extensive investigations to
ascertain the facts and circumstances surrounding each mishap. Because
private litigants, in suits arising from aerial accidents, have scant oppor-
tunity to perform their own investigations, this Board-secured information
may be extremely useful to such parties. 3 The task of sifting the bits of
wreckage and charred structure remaining after a crash requires the highly
technical skills and perceptive powers of trained investigators. 4 Moreover,
the investigators immediately isolate the scene of the wreckage and only the
investigators are allowed to go near the remains of the plane.5 Thus, private
individuals are prevented from making their own investigations. However,
if the Board's entire findings were open to unlimited use in private litigation,
airline operators, in fear of subjecting themselves to vast civil liability,
would be reluctant to submit to the Board any facts which might suggest
operational negligence. 6 Such an inclination could greatly impede the effec-
tiveness of the Board's investigations. Moreover, the Board's examiners are
too few to operate without the assistance of the airlines; and these few
examiners cannot spare the time to become involved in private litigation.
7
In determining the extent to which private parties may use the results of
Board investigations, the Board, Congress, and the courts are faced with the
problem of balancing the need to formulate an adequate program of safety
regulation with the policy of affording individuals the maximum discovery
procedures necessary for successful litigation.
The problem of balancing these interests was recognized by Congress
in the enactment of Section 701(e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act.8 This sec-
tion provides that the accident investigation reports of the Board shall not
be admitted as "evidence" in any suit for damages arising from matters
mentioned in the report. On the surface, this section appears to have granted
an extensive privilege to all information gathered by the Board during the
course of the accident investigation, as well as any conclusions regarding
causation reached by the Board. Believing that anything less than a strict
interpretation of the section will lead to confusion, the Board has interpreted
Section 701(e) in this way.9 Thus, the Board will not release either its
preliminary records and reports or the final Board report to private parties
as a matter of right.'0 Consequently, the Board has realized the possible
inequities involved in a strict interpretation of Section 701(e). Thus, a
private party may not be able to sustain his claim for relief without the
Board's information," or at best avoid a directed verdict against him.12 In
an attempt to balance these interests, the Board has adopted rules of pro-
cedure which allow a controlled use of Board information after a request
has been submitted to the General Counsel of the Board. 13 He has full power
to approve or deny the request depending upon the requisite showing of
necessity by the applicant.14 However, this exemption is explicitly limited
to the material facts,'5 and subsequent Board rules absolutely prohibit testi-
mony by Board employees as expert witnesses.' 6 This includes testimony as
Note: Footnotes follow this article (page 237).
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to facts and opinions incorporated -in Board reports, as well as facts and
opinions garnered by Board employees while working in their official capacity.
The Board believes that these rules do not extend the privilege of Section
701 (e), but only uphold its spirit.17 It is thus contended that if a report is
privileged, everything leading up to the report should be privileged,' 8 and
this must include all matters which have been ascertained by an individual
while employed in an official capacity. 19 Thus, the Board concludes that Sec-
tion 701 (e) can be enforced only by denying private parties the opportunity
to procure the privileged material through the testimony of agency employees
regarding the contents of withheld reports. 20 However, in the event that
these Board rules do, in fact, extend the privilege of Section 701(e), the
Board apparently believes that the rules should have the force of law.21
This belief is based on the constitutional separation of powers between the
different branches of the government, 22 and also on the statutory power
which has been granted the Board by the Act (to make and amend such rules
of procedure as are necessary for its operation). 23 The Board sets forth
several considerations of necessity which support its rules as needed for
proper Board operation. The foremost of these considerations are the need
for full and frank reports24 and the convenience of the agency.25 Also, the
disclosure of Board reports may subject the individual members to political
pressures in reaching their decisions.26 Therefore, the Board feels that such
a necessity gives it the right to use the general rule-making power of the
Act. To a great extent, this right has been supported by Congress 27 and by
the courts.28 Thus, the Board has taken the position that, in any event, its
rules are proper and that the only solution to the problem of Section 701(e)
is compliance with the discretion of the Board.
Although the Board has sought a compromise solution to the Section
701(e) problem, the fact remains that any restriction placed on the Board's
information will have an adverse effect upon the private litigants involved. 29
It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts have confined the interpreta-
tion of Section 701(e) and the Board's rules concerning it. The problem of
the extent to which Board information is privileged under the interpretation
of Section 701(e) was considered in the case of Ritts v. American Overseas
Airlines.80 In that case, the court held that a witness was not precluded by
Section 701 (e) from being examined on matters about which he had testified
at the Board's investigation. The court adopted a narrow interpretation of
the language of Section 701 (e) so that only the final Board report was
excluded, and not the preliminary information gathered during the investi-
gation.3' Shortly thereafter, several cases followed the Ritts case and allowed
the claimant to inspect routine accident reports of the airline which were
submitted to the CAB,3 2 to use the Board report for purposes of refreshing
a witness' memory, or to impeach his veracity,3 3 and to introduce as evidence
the report of a Board investigator pertaining to his examination of the
airplane wreckage.3 4 Thus, with respect to documents, Section 701(e) ex-
cludes only the use of the final Board report.3 5 In Universal Airlines v. East-
ern Airlines, recognition of the Board's rules concerning Section 701 (e)
was directly presented.30 Assuming the reasoning of the Ritts case as its
major premise, the court held that a Board investigator could be subpoenaed
by the court and made to testify to his observations of both the facts and
his opinions regarding the crash.37 However, the court stated it would be
error to compel an agent of the Board to produce any of the Board's reports,
orders, or private files which are privileged, or to testify as to the contents
of any privileged papers.38 Although the court endorsed the policy underlying
the Board's regulations, it stated that the policy must be considered in the
light of judicial power and the function of the courts to administer justice.
The function of a subpoena is to compel attendance of all witnesses (of facts
and opinions) so that the courts may have all available information. There-
JUDICIAL
fore, even though the Board rules are sound, they cannot supersede the
judicial power of the courts.3 9 It appears, therefore, that Section 701(e)
allows the use of opinion testimony given by Board employees, so long as
the opinion is not contained within the privileged final Board report.40 More-
over, irrespective of statutory construction, the rules of evidence will gener-
ally protect the litigants against any inadmissible or prejudicial evidence. 41
CONCLUSION
By confining the apparently broad exclusionary privilege of the statute,
the courts have taken a realistic, but equitable approach to this problem.
Whereas the Board's concern with safety necessitates frank disclosures of
all facts in accident reports, the Board does not want to be involved in
private litigation. Conversely, so that the private litigant may obtain the
fairest adjudication of his cause of action, he desires access to the Board's
accident reports. In balancing these conflicting interests, the courts will
disrupt the Board's regulations only in cases of necessity.
In light of the protection afforded to litigants by the rules of evidence,
and because the Board regulations are protected to as great a degree as
possible by the courts, no statutory changes appear necessary in the present
provisions of Section 701(e), and none are foreseen in the near future.
FOOTNOTES
1 Civil Aeronautics Act Sec. 701(a), 52 Stat. 1012 (1938) as amended, 49
U.S.C. Sec. 581 (1952). Hereinafter referred to as the "Board."
2Civil Aeronautics Act Sec. 702(a), 52 Stat. 1013 (1938), as amended, 49
U.S.C. Sec. 582 (1952).
3 Other avenues available to private parties attempting to secure the facts
involved in the air crash are depositions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and
32) and the discovery procedures, which are written interrogatories directed to a
party opponent (Fed. R. Civ. P. 33), examination, copying and photographing of
documents and property in the possession of opposing parties (Fed. R. Civ. P. 34),
physical and mental examinations of persons (Fed. R. Civ. P. 35), and admissions
of facts and the genuineness of documents from the other party (Fed. R. Civ. P.
36). However, it must be recognized that these procedures can never completely
replace a first-hand investigation of the air crash.
4 See, Section 701(e) of the Act, 52 Stat. 1012 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 581 (1952), whereby the Board is authorized to employ temporary personnel
and to request the services of other government experts in connection with accident
investigations. These temporary experts are generally sought from the individual
air carriers and aircraft manufacturers involved because of their specific knowl-
edge concerning the craft.
5 Brief for the CAB as Amicus Curiae, P. 3, Universal Airlines v. Eastern
Airlines, 188 F. 2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
6 The airlines are required to notify and report any aircraft accidents or
overdue aircraft, 14 C.F.R. Secs. 62.1-62.45 (1956). (Secs. 62.1 to 62.45 were issued
under Sec. 205, 52 Stat. 984, as amended; 49 U.S.C. 425. The regulations interpret
and apply Secs. 601, 702, 52 Stat. 1007, as amended, 1013, as amended; 49 U.S.C.
551, 582.)
7 The statistics available show that in the fiscal year 1949 more than 7,500
accidents involving aircraft were reported to the Board, whereas the Board had,
and still has, less than thirty investigators to make field investigations.
8 52 Stat. 1013 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 581 (1952),
The records and reports of the Board shall be preserved in the custody
of the secretary of the Authority in the same manner and subject to
the same provisions respecting publication as the records and reports
of the Authority, except that any publication thereof shall be styled
"Air Safety Board of the Civil Aeronautics Authority," and that no
part of any report or reports of the Board or the Authority relating
to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as
evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any
matter mentioned in such report or reports.
9 15 Fed. Reg. 6442 (1950).
10 Note 9, supra.
11 Obviously, knowledge and understanding of the% facts involved are necessary
to the private party so that he can deliver the proper arguments to the court and
to the jury. Otherwise, the private party will always be subject to the possibility
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of a directed verdict against him. Furthermore, it must be noted that the personal
injury plaintiff does not have the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in the
majority of states. Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 App. Div. 660, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 288 (2nd
Dept. 1937).
12 The airlines and the aircraft manufacturers (the usual civil defendants in
these cases) are customarily asked to assist the Board's team of investigators in
its investigation, because the technical skills and first-hand knowledge of the builder
and the operator involved are generally very helpful. Thus it is apparent that in
the usual civil action arising from an airplane accident (passenger v. airline or
manufacturer), the passenger may be at a disadvantage. Contrary to the plaintiff's
position, the airline and the manufacturer will have an understanding of the facts
involved as well as the persuasive testimony of their own expert witnesses.
13 See, 14 C.F.R. Sec. 311 (1956) for the complete text of the Board rules.
14 The effect of these rules gives the Board's General Counsel an arbitrary
power to grant or deny the requests submitted by the interested private litigants.15 It must be recognized, however, that the material facts on the surface may
not always be helpful to private parties. In this technical field, the untrained mind
of a private party will not always be able to reach the proper conclusions from the
material facts. Furthermore, the only testimony which will be of real value to ajury of laymen will be the testimony of expert witnesses interpreting the avail-
able facts.
16 Note 13, supra.
17 See, Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) ; Ex Parte Sackett, 74 F. 2d
922 (9th Cir. 1935); Harris v. Walsh, 277 F. 569 (D.C. Cir. 1922).
18 The courts have upheld regulations forbidding executive employees from
testifying in private litigation concerning contents of secret, official files, or to
facts ascertained by them in the course of official business. See, Stegall v. Thurman,
175 F. 813 (N.D. Ga. 1910); In Re Lamberton, 124 F. 446 (S.D. Ark. 1903). (A
contrary rule with respect to production of documents prevails when the govern-
ment is a party.) See e.g., United States v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 503 (2nd Cir.
1944), a criminal case.
19 In Re Hutman, 70 F. 699 (Kan., 1895).
20 Contra, Gerow v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., 188 N.C. 76, 123 S.E. 473 (1924).
The state court, however, did not uphold the privilege of exclusion for railroad
accident reports.
21 Berger and Krash, Government Immunity From Discovery, 59 Yale L. J.
1451 (1950); Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data
Within the Control of Executive Departments, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (1949).
22 This contention is based on the concept of separation of powers inherent in
our constitutional organization of government. From its inception, each branch-
legislative, executive and judicial-has sought to operate in its own sphere and to
refrain from infringing upon the individual provinces of the others. The problem
of defining the individual spheres of influence and jurisdiction arose at an early
stage of our history when the courts decided that they should not interfere with the
discretionary actions of executive officials. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S.
1803). This precedent is still followed. United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen, 340
U.S. 462 (1950). Therefore, because the control of agency records is within the
discretionary authority of the agency head, he should have full power to determine
whether outsiders may be allowed to use the documents.
23 Section 205 of the Civil Aeronautics Act (52 Stat. 984 (1938), as amended,
49 U.S.C. 425 (1946)) authorizes and empowers the Board ... to make and amend
such general or special rules, regulations, and procedure pursuant to and consistent
with the provisions of the Act, as it shall deem necessary to ... perform its powers
and duties under this Act.
24 Truthful disclosures by those who are in a position to know the facts are
important for an accurate investigation by the Board. It must also be recognized,
however, that it is poor policy for the law to bribe a man to be truthful. See,
Wigmore, 19 Ill. L. Rev. 196, 198 (1924).
25 Note 7, supra.
26 Brief for the CAB as Amicus Curiae, P. 6, Universal Airlines v. Eastern
Air Lines, 188 F. 2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
27 Congress has supported this general theory and expressly codified it into the
form of a statute in dealing with the internal powers of the departments of the
executive branch. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 22 (1948). "The head of each department is author-
ized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his
department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance
of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and
property appertaining to it."
28 The courts have held that an administrative agency-226 F. 2d 501 (6th
Cir. 1955)-or executive department-Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900),
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Ex Parte Sackett, 74 F. 2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935), Harris v. Walsh, 277 F. 569 (D.C.
Cir. 1922)-can with impunity, refuse to submit its internal records in response
to a court subpoena if it does so pursuant to its own reasonable rules of procedure.
29 Often the physical facts of the accident may only be pieced together after
much experimentation with the bits of wreckage remaining after a crash. This
task is always performed by the Board. Note 5, supra.
30 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
31 The court, in the Ritts case (note 29, supra), distinguished between the
words "records and reports" in the first line of Section 701(e) and the reference
only to "report or reports" in the exclusionary last line of the section. It was
regarded that this distinction evidenced a Congressional intent to exclude only the
Board reports containing its conclusions which, if admitted into the court, would
prejudice any party who had no part in the investigation. The party would be
injured because he would have no chance to be heard or to cross-examine the wit-
nesses before the Board. The court concluded that the use of records of the Board
hearings was the same as using any statement taken from a witness to refresh his
recollection or to impeach his veracity.
32 In Tansey v. T.W.A., 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.C. 1949), it was held that Section
701 (e) did not prevent a person injured in an aircraft accident from inspecting
and copying both routine records and special reports as to the cause of the accident
prepared by the airline and filed with the Board. This court also distinguished
between the final Board report and the records leading up to this report. It was
stated expressly that the information received in the course of an investigation
was not privileged.
33 Maxwell v. Fink, 264 Wis. 106, 58 N.W. 2d 415 (1953). Recognizing the
distinction between the words, "records" and "reports," the court allowed a Board
expert, testifying as a witness, to refresh his memory from a photostatic copy of
his Board report. The witness was testifying to the facts as he found them at the
scene of an accident. The court said that this did not permit the report to be "used"
in the sense prohibited by Section 701 (e) in cases involving records and testimony
in Board inquiries. By dictum, it stated that this was true whether or not the case
involved a deposition, a pre-trial discovery, or the admissibility of evidence at the
trial.
34 Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F. 2d 217 (2nd Cir. 1951). Here the report
of a Board investigator pertaining to his examination of the airplane wreckage was
admitted as evidence. The court, however, indicated that the report contained no
opinions or conclusions as to the cause of the accident or of the defendant's negli-
gence. Moreover, the report was based entirely on the investigator's personal obser-
vations and was not based on any interviews. Thus, while Section 701 (e) was
designed to guard against the introduction of Board reports expressing Board
views on matters wholly within the functions of courts and juries to decide, the
court emphasized that any testimony or evidence not excluded by Section 701 (e)
still remains subject to the rules regarding hearsay and opinion evidence.
35 See, Isreal v. United States, 247 F. 2d 426 (2nd Cir. 1957).
36 188 F. 2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
37 However, while this court accepted the general proposition, it excluded the
testimony of the questioned witness for other reasons.
38 While this court accepted the rationale of the Hutman case (note 19, supra)
the Lamberton case (note 18, supra) ; and the Stegoll case (note 18, supra), it
recognized that if the government official is testifying about facts which are not
incorporated into privileged reports, they are not privileged even though they were
learned in an official capacity.
39 Implicit recognition was given to the policy considerations favoring a private
litigant's effort to secure evidence necessary to his case.
40 Recognizing this judicial construction of Section 701 (e), a question neces-
sarily presented is whether or not this construction of the section is consistent with
its legislative history. However, there is virtually no history of this section which
can be used as a guide. The various proposals made in each house from which the
present Civil Aeronautics Act evolved were very similar in all respects, and it was
agreed to without comment by a joint committee of the House and Senate. 83 Cong.
Rec. 8843-8869, 8961-8963 (1938). There was testimony of only one witness relating
to this section at the Congressional hearings on the Act. The value of this lone
statement is certainly not conclusive as evidencing any legislative intent one way or
the other. Therefore, the intent of the Act can only be ascertained by way of infer-
ence from similar statutes which preceded it. Section 701 (e) of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act was modeled after the somewhat similar provisions contained in Section
2 (e) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended in 1934. The provisions of this
act were in turn derived from the comparable provisions of certain Safety Acts
relating to railroads. (36 Stat. 916 (1911), 45 U.S.C. 33 (1940) ; 36 Stat. 351 (1910),
45 U.S.C. 41 (1940).) The general purpose of all these statutes was to promote
and regulate adequate standards of safety for the carriers. Hence, it may be argued
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that since the purpose of these prior acts and the Civil Aeronautics Act are the
same, the exclusionary privileges in each statute should be construed in the same
way regardless of its language. This argument is based on the premise that the
ends of safety demand frank disclosures in accident reports by airline operators
and that anything less than a complete exclusionary privilege will discourage frank
disclosures. Also, safety investigations demand the full time of agency employees
and they cannot be bothered with court appearances. As previously noted, this is
in accord with the Board's view of the statute. (See, text P. 5, supra.) The courts
have not accepted this argument and have interpreted the changes in language in
the previous statutes and Section 701 (e) to show the intent of the legislature to
make privileged only the actual Board report and not the records of the Board,
or its hearings and investigations, or the expert testimonj of its employees. (See,
note 29, supra, which states the rationale of the Ritts case.) The language of
Section 701 (e) supports this argument. The exclusionary privileges of the three
acts are drafted in different language and terms, especially the old Air Commerce
Act. Its exclusionary privilege was drawn up in much stronger and broader terms
than the similar section in the Civil Aeronautics Act, i.e., Section 701(e). It is
consistent with the purpose of the statute and legislative discussion of all three
statutes to conclude that Congress has narrowed provisions of Section 701(e).
41 The rules of evidence generally exclude from the court any hearsay state-
ments. 5 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1361, 6 id. Sec. 1766 (3d ed. 1940) ; Morgan,
The Hearsay Rule, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1937); for cases discussing and illustrat-
ing the nature of hearsay, see Morgan, Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481,
541 (1946). In the field of aerial accident investigation, the investigator must rely
to a great extent upon statements given by third parties regarding the facts. Thus,
he will seldom have first hand information and the evils of hearsay will be implicit
in the investigator's personal knowledge of the facts or the records and reports of
the Board. Such evidence will generally be excluded from the courtroom. The pit-
falls of the hearsay rule may be avoided if the record containing the Board em-
ployee's hearsay is used by him as past recollection recorded with his own testimony
in court. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence, Secs. 734-757 (3d ed. 1940) ; Universal Airline
v. Eastern Air Lines, 188 F. 2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951). In this way, the evils are
overcome for the asserter is in the court under oath, and he may be cross-examined
by the opposing party. The hearsay statements may come within one of the many
exceptions to the general rule. See McCormick, Evidence, Secs 223-299 (1954). The
most likely exceptions are admissions by party-opponents. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence,
Secs. 1048-1087 (3d ed. 1940) ; McCormick, Evidence, Secs. 239-252 (1954) or
declarations against interest by a person not a party to the suit. See 5 Wigmore,
Evidence, Secs. 1455-1477 (3d ed. 1940) ; Morgan, Declarations Against Interest,
5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952). Furthermore, it is possible to use these statements in
other ways to by-pass the hearsay rule, such as to impeach a witness. See McCor-
mick, Evidence, Secs. 33-50 (1954); Maxwell v. Fink, 264 Wis. 106, 58 N.W. 2d
415 (1953). If the hearsay statement is itself based on other out-of-courtroom
assertions of third parties, each statement must satisfy the requirements of some
hearsay exception to be admissible into evidence.
Closely aligned to the hearsay provisions is the rule excluding a witness' testi-
mony concerning his opinions. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence, Secs. 650-670 (3d ed.
1940). The general rule demands that a witness testify only to those facts within
his knowledge and not to testify to his opinions concerning the issues of the case.
See 7 Wigmore, Evidence, Secs. 1917-2028 (3d ed. 1940). Otherwise the witness
would usurp the jury's function of determining the liability of the parties based
on the facts presented at the trial. Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Springfield & N.W. R.
Co., 67 Ill. 142 (1873). However, in such a technical field, there is a need for expert
opinion and the courts usually make an exception to the general rule excluding
opinion testimony. To give an opinion, the expert must be qualified and must have
first-hand knowledge of the facts involved. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1923 and
Sec. 1925 (3d ed. 1940) ; Bratt v. Western Airlines, 155 F. 2d 850 (10th Cir. 1946).
If the expert has no first-hand knowledge, or only a knowledge based on hearsay
assertions, he may still give his opinion in answer to a hypothetical question based
on stated, assumed facts. There are two basic requirements for a hypothetical
question: 1. the facts which the question assumes must be clear to the jury, and
2. the date assumed must not be conflicting. See McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 14
(1954). However, it must be remembered that the evidence or opinion from the
Board or its experts will often impress the pury far more than it properly should.
See brief for Appellant, pp. 26, 27, Universal Airline v. Eastern Air Lines, 188
F. 2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1951). In this field, the jury must depend to a great extent on
expert testimony, and it will surely be impressed by the conclusions of a person
who bears the responsibility to determine questions of causation. This may unfairly
prejudice one of the parties. Therefore, while the courts cannot determine the
weight to be given to admissible evidence, it can be stated surely that the rules of
evidence will protect the parties from admission of prejudicial evidence into court.
